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I. Introduction
Since 2008, issuers have devised several new
principal-protected structured notes in an attempt
to accommodate issuers’ and investors’ appetites.
While the exact reasons for these innovations are
not always apparent, the markets of the past four
years have had some fairly unusual characteristics.
Market interest rates dropped to historical lows
both in nominal and real terms and have remained
at low levels. Also, record volatility and economic
crises have driven demand for safer and more
predictable returns.
On the investors’ side, extremely low rates paid
on so-called vanilla debt, even long-term straight
debt,1 are frustrating to fixed-income investors.
Issuers, wishing to capitalize on that environment
and appeal to investors seeking higher returns
(even if those returns arise at the expense of future
periods), have created instruments that offer higher
current or future coupons but with caveats dis-
cussed in detail below.
Those instruments largely fall into one of three
categories: (i) fixed-to-floating rate notes; (ii) range
accrual notes; or (iii) step-up notes. While these
structures accomplish commercial objectives, they
raise many tax questions for investors and issuers.
In this report, we discuss the tax treatment of these
debt instruments and some tax questions they raise.
We explain the structure of each instrument and
its business rationale in light of the current environ-
ment, then discuss tax treatment, noting relevant
tax issues. In some cases, existing guidance fails to
address those issues or, when applied mechanically,
yields potentially illogical results. We cautiously
assert that some of those issues may be novel to
issuers, underwriters, and practitioners.
1For example, when this report was written, the 10-year
Constant Maturity Treasury rate was a mere 2.03 percent.
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Low market rates call for
special types of debt instru-
ments. This report discusses
the tax questions presented by
several of those instruments,
including fixed-to-floating rate
instruments, range accrual debt
instruments, and callable
step-up instruments. The au-
thors note several ambiguities in the regulations
regarding variable-rate and contingent payment
debt instruments and call for clarification. They
also explore some counterintuitive results of the
technical operation of the regulations and argue
that a possible explanation may be that the regula-
tions were drafted during times of different market
characteristics.
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II. Fixed-to-Floating Rate Notes
A. The Structure
One way investors have tried to increase current
returns is by requesting that issuers structure notes
providing for a high upfront coupon for an initial
term. After that, the holder generally receives inter-
est at a short-term floating rate (such as three-
month USD LIBOR (3m LIBOR)) plus a small
spread. Investors are essentially speculating that the
base floating rate will increase more than expected
by the time the floating rate period begins by
‘‘trading’’ a below-market spread in the floating
rate period for an above-market fixed rate now.
Some notes include an interest rate cap during all or
part of the floating period, which usually translates
to a higher interest rate paid to the investors up-
front. We refer to those instruments as fixed-to-
floating (FTF) notes.
As explained below, we believe it is possible that
the drafters of reg. section 1.1275-5, the regulations
that generally apply to most FTF notes (the
variable-rate debt instrument (VRDI) regulations),
perceived FTF notes as a product of risk aversion,
rather than as a structure that may allow for timing
benefits. Namely, in some cases, FTF notes could be
designed to mitigate risk by providing holders a
return similar to a floating rate but with a fixed
return for a specific period so as to reduce risk.
Presumably, investors will be willing to pay some-
thing for that interest rate fixing, but the drafters of
the VRDI regulations seem to have assumed that
the fixed rate is intended to produce a return similar
to the floating rate. In a low-rate environment, that
is generally not the case. Investors are willing to
accept low returns down the road in exchange for
an above-market return now. Holders may also
assume that by the time the FTF notes reach their
low-rate phase, the low rate will not be as low, and
more importantly, there will be some economic
recovery that will allow them to meet their targeted
returns through other investments (and they will
have some cash to deploy — the cash they received
during the fixed period of the FTF notes). Also,
while seemingly unlikely, FTF notes could allow
some holders to distort returns upward by effec-
tively reallocating future period returns to current
periods unless nontax rules on reporting returns
properly adjust for that.
Those structures may yield odd (and sometimes
holder-favorable) tax treatment, which we discuss
below. For the purposes of the subsequent discus-
sion, assume the relevant FTF note is a principal-
protected instrument with a term of seven years,
bearing quarterly interest payments. For the first 18
months, payments are fixed at a rate of 4 percent
per year (assume that this is an above-market rate).
Thereafter, quarterly payments are made at a rate of
3m LIBOR plus a spread of 150 basis points. For the
final four years, interest payments are subject to a
cap of 7 percent per year.
B. Tax Classification
When a debt instrument does not pay a fixed
rate, but rather provides for interest rates deter-
mined by a formula, one must determine whether
the instrument is a VRDI as defined in the VRDI
regulations,2 or a contingent payment debt instru-
ment (CPDI).3 As prescribed by the regulations, a
VRDI is a debt instrument that provides for stated
interest, compounded or paid at least annually, at
one of four possibilities: (i) one or more qualified
floating rates; (ii) a single fixed rate and one or more
qualified floating rates; (iii) a single objective rate;
or (iv) a single fixed rate and a single objective rate
that is a qualified inverse floating rate.4
1. Qualified floating rate. Given that FTF notes, by
definition, provide for an initial fixed-rate period,
they can qualify as VRDIs only under option (ii) or
(iv) — that is, a single fixed rate and one or more
qualified floating rates, or a single fixed rate and a
single objective rate that is a qualified inverse
floating rate (subject to the special rules for a
fixed-rate period shorter than a year discussed
below).5 The FTF note discussed above pays interest
at a rate of 3m LIBOR plus 150 basis points during
the floating rate period. A rate constitutes a quali-
fied floating rate (QFR) ‘‘if variations in the value of
the rate can reasonably be expected to measure
contemporaneous variations in the cost of newly
borrowed funds in the currency in which the debt
instrument is denominated.’’6 The fluctuations in
the variable rate in our example will follow fluctua-
tions in LIBOR, which is a market benchmark for
the cost of borrowing.7 In addition, the VRDI regu-
lations specifically contemplate a QFR plus a fixed
spread.8 Hence, 3m LIBOR plus the 150 basis points
spread will qualify as a QFR.
2. Caps, floors, and other governors. But wait! A
cap applies during the floating rate period. To the
extent the cap functions to limit the rate, fluctua-
tions in interest payments would not satisfy the
2Reg. section 1.1275-5.
3See reg. section 1.1275-4.
4Reg. section 1.1275-5(3)(i).
5Theoretically, if the fixed-rate period lasts less than a year,
FTF notes could qualify as VRDIs under option (i) as well. See
infra text accompanying note 28. As for option (iv), because of
the relative scarcity of instruments that provide for an inverse
floating rate, our discussion focuses on an instrument that pays
a floating rate plus a spread.
6Reg. section 1.1275-5(b)(1).
7See reg. section 1.1275-5(d), Example 1.
8See reg. section 1.1275-5(b)(2)(ii), 1.1275-5(d), Example 2.
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QFR requirement that the floating rate measures
contemporaneous variations in the cost of newly
borrowed funds. The drafters of the regulations
anticipated that and prescribed several rules re-
garding ‘‘caps, floors, and other governors.’’ Most
relevantly, as long as the cap is fixed throughout the
term of the debt instrument, the variable rate will
still be a good QFR.9 That raises the question: What
does it mean to say that the cap is fixed throughout
the term of the debt?
Let’s assume that in our example the 7 percent
cap is fixed during the entire floating period. Obvi-
ously, when a debt instrument provides for an
initial fixed interest period followed by a floating
interest period subject to a cap, the cap has little
meaning for the fixed period. One way to deal with
that is to take an approach under which — as long
as the interest rate during the fixed period is below
the cap — the result is the same as if the cap applied
during the entire term. That is, the cap is not
implicated during the initial term, and therefore
whether the cap applies during the fixed period is
essentially irrelevant.
In our example, however, that interpretation is
unhelpful because the cap is not even fixed
throughout the floating rate period. But that is not
necessarily a fatal blow to the QFR qualification,
because there is a second exception to the fixed cap
rule. Specifically, a variable rate subject to a cap will
not be disqualified if ‘‘it is not reasonably expected
as of the issue date to cause the yield on the debt
instrument to be significantly less than the expected
yield determined without the cap.’’10 From a policy
perspective that makes some sense. If, despite the
cap, the rate is still expected to measure the cost of
newly borrowed funds, there is little sense in dis-
qualifying it just because it is a ‘‘sticker cap,’’
meaning that the instrument’s payment schedule is
still likely to largely follow the contemporaneous
variations in the cost of newly borrowed funds.11
3. The VRDI regulations’ ambiguity — governors.
The requirement that a cap is not reasonably ex-
pected as of the issue date to cause the yield on the
debt instrument to be significantly less than the
expected yield determined without the cap exposes
three major weaknesses in the regulations.
First, there is absolutely no regulatory guidance
on what it means to ‘‘reasonably expect’’ that the
cap will affect the yield. Should reasonable expec-
tation be treated as something relatively substantial
but not ‘‘more likely than not,’’ as it is in terms of
level of confidence in a tax position? And what is a
‘‘significant’’ enough effect to disqualify the rate
from being a QFR? We are not aware of any
on-point guidance, which leaves practitioners to
their traditional exercise of analogizing to more
concrete standards found elsewhere in the code.
There often is not much at stake, because the
instrument’s tax treatment may be relatively similar
whether it is considered a VRDI or a CPDI.12 That is
not necessarily the case for FTF notes, however,
which (as discussed below) increases the need for
guidance.
From our experience, some informal standards
have emerged to measure whether it is reasonably
expected as of the issue date that the yield will be
significantly affected. For example, issuers gener-
ally model the expected rates to be paid throughout
the term of an instrument and are thus able to
calculate the probabilities that a cap will be hit at
any given time. Because prospective fluctuations in
interest rates tend to increase as one looks further
into the future, the highest probability for hitting
the cap is in the final year of the note’s term. Again,
no benchmark standard exists, but we believe a 50
percent expectation that the cap will be hit is
reasonable and that lower probabilities might be
reasonable as well.
Also, issuers can calculate the value at which a
similar note would have been issued absent the cap,
and hence can present the tax attorney with yield
comparables. That said, again there is no guidance
as to what would constitute a ‘‘significant’’ differ-
ence. However, some guidance can be inferred by
using the debt modification regulations under sec-
tion 1001. Under those regulations, a change in the
yield of a debt instrument by the greater of (i) 25
basis points or (ii) 5 percent of the annual yield of
the unmodified instrument constitutes a significant
modification and causes a deemed exchange for tax
9Reg. section 1.1275-5(b)(3)(i).
10Reg. section 1.1275-5(b)(3)(ii). Similar rules apply regard-
ing floors and other governors. Reg. section 1.1275-5(b)(3)(iii),
(iv).
11Reg. section 1.1275-5(b)(1).
12See David C. Garlock et al., Federal Income Taxation of Debt
Instruments, para. 803 (2011). While Garlock’s assertion that ‘‘the
CPDI rules as applied to debt instruments issued for cash that
fall outside of the VRDI rules because of an impermissible cap,
floor, or governor do not produce materially different results
than under the VRDI rules’’ is generally correct, some differ-
ences do exist. Most notably, a characterization of an instrument
as a CPDI will cause all gain recognized on its sale to be
ordinary (reg. section 1.1275-4(b)(8)(i)), while gain recognized
on the sale or exchange of a VRDI will generally only be
ordinary to the extent of accrued but unpaid interest. Less
substantive but still important from a market perspective, is that
classification of an instrument as a CPDI burdens issuers with
additional disclosure and reporting requirements (potentially
requiring the use of outside vendors), and holders with some-
what more confusing tax compliance issues.
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purposes.13 Because that standard is based on ob-
jective numbers, practitioners often import it into
other determinations in the debt context.14 Obvi-
ously, it is hard to predict what 5 percent of the
annual yield will be for a floating rate note, whether
that yield would be reduced by 25 basis points, or
whether that is an appropriate analogy. At the very
least, however, it provides a benchmark from an-
other rule in the debt context.
This calls for some clarification. Notes are usually
priced as a percentage of their face amount. Let’s
assume, for example, that a note that pays quarterly
coupons at an annual rate of 10-year LIBOR, has a
term to maturity of 10 years, and has a cap of 5
percent for the final year will be priced at 100
percent. If an investor would be willing to pay 101
percent of the face amount to eliminate the cap,
would the difference be significant? The answer
depends on whether the deemed note with the
higher face amount would produce a yield that is
significantly different (compared with the real note)
under the debt-modification benchmarks discussed
above. While not directly on point, that procedure
yields a quantitative measure of the economic sig-
nificance of the cap.
In summary, a practitioner may want to ask two
questions in determining whether an unfixed cap
disqualifies the rate from being a QFR. First, what is
the probability that the cap is hit during the final
year? If the answer is more than 50 percent (or some
other benchmark the practitioner believes approxi-
mates a reasonable expectation), the practitioner
could then ask a second question: How would the
market price the same note without the cap? If the
answer would yield a note that produces a yield
that is significantly different as compared with the
real note, the practitioner may feel it is appropriate
to conclude that the yield is reasonably expected to
be significantly affected by the cap and hence
should be treated as a CPDI.
C. The OID Rules as Applied to FTF Notes
1. OID calculation. The process of calculating origi-
nal issue discount on an FTF note is slightly arcane
and technical, but understanding it is necessary for
following the rest of this section.
Specifically, if a VRDI provides for stated interest
at one or more QFRs and also provides for stated
interest at an initial single fixed rate, an issuer
determines interest and OID accruals by construct-
ing an equivalent fixed rate debt instrument.15 The
hypothetical note is constructed as follows:
1. The issuer replaces the initial fixed rate with
a QFR (the assumed QFR), which results in the
modified instrument having approximately
the same fair market value as the original
instrument as of the issue date.16
2. The issuer then plugs in the current value as
of the issue date into the assumed QFR and the
actual QFR to produce a hypothetical instru-
ment that provides for interest at an initial
fixed rate followed by another fixed rate. Let’s
return to our example of the note having
payments fixed at a rate of 4 percent per year
for 18 months, followed by payments at a rate
of 3m LIBOR plus a spread of 150 basis points.
Let us also assume that the assumed QFR will
be keyed off the 3m LIBOR.17 Finally, let us
assume that as of the settlement date, 3m
LIBOR is 0.3 percent. If the market projects
that interest rates will increase, the assumed
QFR will be 3m LIBOR plus a spread that
results in a QFR that is slightly less than the
fixed rate (4 percent), because there is embed-
ded value in the expectation that interest rates
would go up.18 Let’s say that our issuer pro-
vides us with an assumed QFR of 3m LIBOR
plus 350 basis points. That will result in the
assumed QFR having a value of 3.8 percent as
of the settlement date. As explained above, the
slight difference as compared with the actual
fixed rate (4 percent) represents the value
embedded in the possibility that the assumed
QFR will fluctuate.19 The actual QFR will
equal 1.8 percent (0.3 + 1.5) as of the issue date.
3. The fixed rate substitutes are then used to
construct an equivalent fixed rate debt instru-
ment. Namely, our fixed rate debt instrument
equivalent will be a seven-year instrument
that pays quarterly coupons at an annual rate
of 3.8 percent for 18 months, and quarterly
coupons thereafter at an annual rate of 1.8
percent until maturity.
13See reg. section 1.1001-3(e)(2).
14We understand, for instance, that advisers often use that
standard as a benchmark as to whether a contingency is
‘‘incidental’’ (and therefore, because of the exception in reg.




17The regulatory language is broad enough to permit a rate
based on any QFR. That said, as a practical matter, issuers
usually key these calculations off the QFR they actually use for
the specific instrument (in this case, 3m LIBOR).
18In other words, the assumed QFR spread should equal the
fixed rate, minus the value of the embedded option, minus the
value of the QFR.
19If the market expects that interest rates will decline, the
difference would be positive. That said, in a high-rate environ-
ment, no one would issue these notes.
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4. Finally, the amount of qualified stated inter-
est (QSI) and OID are computed based on that
equivalent fixed rate debt instrument, subject
to some adjustments.20 The QSI in that case
will be the lowest rate of interest, which is the
amount of interest unconditionally payable.21
QSI or OID accruals are adjusted if the interest
actually accrued or paid during an accrual
period exceeds (or is less than) the interest
assumed to be accrued or paid during the
accrual period under the equivalent fixed rate
debt instrument.22 Thus, during the initial
fixed period, the QSI will be 1.8 percent plus
the difference between the amount actually
paid (4 percent) and the amount assumed to be
paid (3.8 percent). In total, the QSI for the
initial period will be 2 percent (1.8 percent plus
(4 percent minus 3.8 percent)).
Now that we have the reconstructed fixed rate
debt instrument, we can calculate the total amount
of OID. Since the assumed QSI is 1.8 percent, and
our instrument is assumed to be paying 1.8 percent
per annum, except in the initial 18-month period
(when the payment is assumed to be made at 3.8
percent), all the OID is created in the initial period.
In other words, the amounts paid in excess of the
QSI of 1.8 percent during the initial period (mean-
ing (3.8 percent minus 1.8 percent) times the face
amount times 18 months, or $30 per $1,000 face
amount), will be added to the stated redemption
price at maturity, and will result in OID.23
2. Why investors may value OID in FTF notes. A
high fixed rate, followed by a low variable rate, is
an easy-sell commodity in a low-rate environment.
The fixed rate is intentionally designed not to
approximate the floating rate and effectively ‘‘buys
down’’ the floating rate. As a result, the difference
between the fixed rate (4 percent) and the QSI
during the fixed period (2 percent) is significant,
and is all treated as OID (in total, 3 percent of the
face amount).24 That amount will be accrued by
holders based on the regular OID rules — namely,
over the term of the notes (seven years), based on
the constant yield method.25 During the first 18
months, holders will be paid 4 percent coupons in
cash. However, they will only have to recognize the
part of the coupon attributable to the QSI (2 per-
cent), plus the minimal part of the OID allocable to
that period. The difference will be, in effect, a
nontaxable repayment of principal. David Garlock
has described that result as ‘‘clearly inappropri-
ate.’’26 According to Garlock, to avoid that problem,
‘‘the regulations replace the fixed rate [with] a
QFR. . . . The replacement rate must be one that
results in approximately the same value for the
instrument on the issue date.’’27
The shortcomings of the VRDI regulations now
become evident. If we accept Garlock’s position that
the allocation of initial fixed period OID over the
life of the note is inappropriate, and if we assume
that to avoid that problem the drafters replaced the
fixed rate with an equivalent-value QFR, the impli-
cation is that the drafters must have assumed that a
substitute floating rate that will maintain the value
of the note will, at least to some extent, approximate
the floating rate to follow. If that were the case, the
‘‘spreading’’ of the initial period OID over the term
of the instrument would not be as problematic. That
would have made sense if what drives those fixed-
to-float structures is risk aversion, and if investors
are willing to pay a bit more than they would for
simple floating rate notes to avoid interest rate
fluctuation risk for a defined period (and some of
the costs associated with hedging these risks). In
that case, we would probably see notes issued with
a fixed rate very similar to the current value of the
floating rate, with some variation depending on
current forward rates. Even if it is not conclusively
presumed that the two rates are intended to ap-
proximate each other,28 the equivalent fixed rate
note would probably produce rates with minimal
difference from each other. That will result in an
OID of minimal significance (or even OID below the
de minimis threshold prescribed by the OID regu-
lations).
In our example, our equivalent fixed rate note
will have a yield to maturity (YTM) of about 2.23
percent on average.29 The part of the OID allocable
to the first year, for example, will be the difference
between the OID and the QSI, or about 0.23 percent
times the face amount (2.23 of YTM minus 2 percent
20See reg. section 1.1275-5(e)(3), (4).
21Reg. section 1.1273-1(c)(1)(ii), (4), Example 3.
22See reg. section 1.1275-5(e)(3)(iv). Only QSI is adjusted if
the amount of the adjustment is actually paid and the instru-
ment provides for QSI. Id.
23Reg. section 1.1273-1(c)(4).
24(4 percent - 2 percent) x 1.5 years.
25Reg. section 1.1271-1.
26See Garlock, supra note 12, at para. 804.03, Example 8-2.
One could argue, however, that the result is appropriate,
because income inclusions more closely reflect the expected
return on the instrument.
27Id.
28That is the case if the fixed rate is being paid for a period
of one year or less, and the fixed rate and the floating rate — as
of the issue date — are within 25 basis points of each other. Then
the initial fixed rate is simply ignored, and all interest is QSI.
Reg. section 1.1275-5(a)(3)(ii).
29One and a half years of 3.8 percent, followed by five and a
half years of 1.8 percent.
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of OID).30 During the initial year, our holder will
pay tax on 2.23 percent while getting a 4 percent
coupon — approximately a 45 percent tax discount!
How great is that? Risk aversion had nothing to do
with our structure. It is an instrument specifically
designed to meet market demand in a low-rate
environment.
Of course, that is not an exemption from taxes,
but a deferral. In the years to follow, our investors
will have to accrue their OID based on the same
YTM (about 2.23 percent) even though they expect
to be paid only 1.8 percent in coupons. However,
the deferral may provide a real benefit to holders, in
net present value terms. In sum, while the issuance
of the notes is certainly not driven by tax reasons,
but rather by macroeconomic reasons, the notes
could carry a nice side benefit in the form of a tax
deferral.
The one large caveat to that analysis is that the
deferral is not one-sided from the Treasury’s point
of view. The issuer’s deductions are deferred as
well, which could sometimes offset the benefit.
When the issuer is foreign, otherwise tax indiffer-
ent, or even just facing a lower marginal rate than
the holder, the benefit of deferral persists.
3. Is it de minimis? The final FTF notes issue is the
calculation of the de minimis OID threshold. Gen-
erally speaking, if the total OID for a debt instru-
ment is less than 0.25 percent, times the stated
redemption price at maturity (SRPM), times the
number of full years to maturity, OID is considered
to be de minimis, and thus can be ignored.31 That
simple rule does not hold true for FTF notes that are
treated as VRDIs. As noted above, only part of the
coupon being paid during the initial fixed period
will be attributable to QSI and OID and will consti-
tute taxable income for that period. The difference
between the amount paid (4 percent in our ex-
ample) and the part of it that constitutes currently
taxable income (about 2.23 percent in our example),
or 1.77 percent, will constitute a repayment of
principal. That will obviously necessitate the adjust-
ment of the issue price and cause a reduction in the
investor’s basis in the notes. The investor will
‘‘regain’’ its basis during the later periods, in which
it will recognize income for amounts that exceed the
amounts actually paid. Thus, if the investor holds
the notes until maturity, it should not recognize any
gain or loss on account of the principal repayment
at that time.
However, there is another side effect to the
repayment of principal. It presumably triggers the
special de minimis OID rules for installment obli-
gations. Under the OID regulations, ‘‘an installment
obligation is a debt instrument that provides for the
payment of any amount other than qualified stated
interest before maturity.’’32 Because FTF notes pro-
vide for principal payment, in effect, they fall under
that definition. For those notes, the de minimis
threshold is generally revised by either replacing
the 0.25 percent multiplier of the regular threshold
with a 0.167 percent multiplier, or by multiplying
the 0.25 percent multiplier with the weighted aver-
age maturity of the instrument.33 That means that
the multiplier for the de minimis threshold will
always be less than 0.25 percent, which means a
lower threshold, which means any discount is less
likely to be de minimis (which is good for investors,
as they are more likely to enjoy the tax deferral
discussed above).
But wait! The only reason the special installment
obligation rule kicked in is because the note makes
principal payments during the term. And the only
reason the note is deemed to be making principal
payments during the term is that it has OID (which
presumably is not de minimis, or otherwise it is
ignored). In other words, we first have to determine
that OID is not de minimis (and hence there are
principal payments during the term of the notes) to
determine which de minimis rule we need to use —
classic circular logic.
We suggest that the way out of that loop is rather
simple. Given the generous holder-favorable treat-
ment of de minimis OID, we believe one should test
OID for the high threshold — namely, the 25 basis
point threshold. If OID is not de minimis by that
threshold, it is certainly not de minimis under the
more permissive threshold. If the result is a close
call, one should judge whether to test OID under
the 16.7 basis point threshold or in accordance with
the weighted average maturity.30The OID allocable to an accrual period equals the product
of the adjusted issue price of the debt instrument at the
beginning of the accrual period (which, for the first period,
equals the face amount) and the yield of the debt instrument,
less the amount of any qualified stated interest allocable to the
accrual period. Reg. section 1.1271-1(b)(1)(iii).
31Section 1273(a)(3); reg. section 1.1273-1(d)(2). It has long
confused one of the authors why issuers do not affirmatively
structure notes to maximize timing and character benefits
provided by that seemingly generous threshold and the related
elections (such as the ability to deduct de minimis OID on a
straight-line rather than a constant-yield basis under reg. section
1.163-7(b)(2)).
32Reg. section 1.1273-1(e)(1).
33Reg. section 1.1273-1(d)(3). The weighted average maturity
of the instrument is an aggregation of the sums of each payment
of ‘‘(i) The number of complete years from the issue date until
the payment is made, multiplied by (ii) A fraction, the numera-
tor of which is the amount of the payment and the denominator
of which is the debt instrument’s stated redemption price at
maturity.’’ Reg. section 1.1273-1(e)(3). That will always result in
a number larger than zero but smaller than one.
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The bottom line, we think, is that that is another
example of a market effect, unpredicted by the
drafters of the regulations. OID of more than the de
minimis amount is usually unfavorable to inves-
tors, as it requires them to accrue OID over the term
of the note. In that case, OID is favorable. If OID had
been de minimis, all interest would have been
treated as QSI, recognized in accordance with the
investors’ regular method of accounting. If OID is
not de minimis, the result, as explained above, is a
counterintuitive tax deferral during the fixed pe-
riod. The special rules for de minimis OID for
installment obligations, which might hurt taxpayers
in other instances, actually help investors in FTF
notes by lowering the de minimis threshold, thus
making it more likely for investors in those notes to
enjoy what appears to be a counterintuitive tax
deferral.
III. Range Accrual Notes
A. The Structure
As we have seen, FTF notes provide investors
with a high initial coupon in a low-rate environ-
ment. Nevertheless, investors remain exposed to
market rates in later years. The price for the fixed
high-coupon period is a subsequent (generally
longer) floating period in which investors are paid a
short-term market rate (typically 3m LIBOR) plus a
small spread. Put differently, investors are still
directly exposed to market rates after the initial
period.
Some investors prefer to go a step further in
detaching cash flows from market interest rates.
Range accrual notes (RANs) provide an excellent
solution. A RAN is a principal-protected debt in-
strument that derives higher returns in a low-rate
environment, because the typically high interest on
those notes accrues as long as specific conditions
are met (namely, interest accrues as long as some
reference asset or market data are within a particu-
lar range, hence ‘‘range accrual’’). For example, in a
low-rate environment, a high coupon may accrue as
long as an equity index is above a particular thresh-
old. That way, the ‘‘fixed income’’ is detached from
the market definer of interest rates. Rather, interest
will be paid as long as the equity index remains
above a fixed level. Some notes provide for a fixed
income for a set initial period.
To protect the issuer (and to prevent the notes
from being prohibitively expensive), issuers usually
add a discretionary call feature to those notes.34 If at
any time the issuer perceives the structure to be too
costly, the notes will be called for their face amount.
At that point, the holder of the RAN may want to
roll its position, pay a little bit more for the structure
(or a similar structure) and have the note reissued,
or simply agree to a change in terms in lieu of
having the notes called.35
This time, assume a note that has a term of 15
years. For the first two years, the note pays quar-
terly interest payments at a rate of 7 percent per
year (assumed to be well above market rate). For
the rest of the term, interest accrues at a rate of 7
percent as long as the S&P 500 Index does not drop
below 80 percent of its level on the date of the note’s
issuance. Thus, for example, if during the first
quarter of the third year the index was below the 80
percent threshold for 45 days out of 90, at the end of
the period, holders will get a coupon of 0.875
percent for that period (7 percent divided by 4,
divided by 2), reflecting an annual rate of 3.5
percent. Also, the issuer has an unconditional right
to call the notes at a price equal to 100 percent of the
face amount plus any accrued and unpaid interest
on each interest payment date, beginning with the
fourth interest payment date. The issuer would
presumably exercise the option in the event of a
significant market upturn.
B. Tax Classification
1. In general. Under the VRDI regulations, a debt
instrument will qualify as a VRDI if it provides for
a stated interest that is accrued or compounded at
least annually at a single objective rate.36 For that
purpose, an objective rate is one ‘‘that is determined
using a single fixed formula and that is based on
objective financial or economic information.’’
When a RAN such as ours does not provide for a
fixed-rate period, the stated rate should easily
qualify as an objective rate, because it is the result of
a single formula (for each period: (days above
trigger/total number of days in a period) x accrual
rate), which is based on objective financial informa-
tion (the level of the S&P 500). Some RANs are as
simple as that, and thus qualify as VRDIs with the
result that all interest payments are treated as QSI,
meaning that investors are able to account for
interest payments based on their regular method of
34Obviously, it would be very unusual for an issuer to take a
naked financial position in the notes it is issuing. However, the
‘‘better’’ the note (from an investor’s point of view), the more
expensive it is for the issuer to hedge its exposure. That lowers
the issuer’s benefit. Issuers thus design structures that will
enable them to market the sought-for benefit to the investors,
while lowering the cost of hedging. The call feature achieves just
that.
35Whether the rollover or change of term would constitute a
taxable event would be tested under the standards of reg.
section 1.1001-3.
36Reg. section 1.1275-5(a)(3)(C).
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tax accounting. That is generally a fairly simple and
preferred tax treatment for most holders.
However, two relatively common features in
RANs make the analysis a bit more complex. The
first is a fixed-period feature, and the second is the
possibility that payments on the RANs are front- or
backloaded.
2. Presence of a fixed-rate period. Generally speak-
ing, a fixed-rate period combined with a period of
stated interest based on objective financial informa-
tion disqualifies an instrument from being a VRDI,
as the rate of interest is no longer a ‘‘single objective
rate,’’ as required by reg. section 1.275-5(a)(3)(C).37
However, reg. section 1.1275-5(a)(3)(ii) provides an
exception. It prescribes that if interest on a debt
instrument is (i) stated at a fixed rate for an initial
period of one year or less followed by a variable
rate that is an objective rate or a QFR for a subse-
quent period, and (ii) the value of the variable rate
on the issue date is intended to approximate the
fixed rate, then the fixed rate and the variable rate
together constitute a single objective rate or a QFR.
In our example, the initial fixed rate lasts two years,
and hence the instrument fails the first prong of the
exception. Thus, the initial fixed period cannot be
disregarded, which makes the instrument in our
example a CPDI.38
It is important to note, however, that most RANs
(if not all) that provide for a fixed period of one year
or less will necessarily meet the second prong of the
test (that is, that the fixed rate and the objective rate
are intended to approximate each other), and hence
will qualify as VRDIs (subject to the discussion in
front- or backloading below). That is so because ‘‘a
fixed rate and a variable rate will be conclusively
presumed to [approximate each other] if the value
of the variable rate on the issue date does not differ
from the value of the fixed rate by more than 0.25
percent (25 basis points).’’39 Consider our example.
As of the day of issuance, the level of the S&P 500 is
obviously at 100 percent of its initial level. Thus, as
of the issue date, the objective variable interest
would have accrued at 7 percent, which is identical
to the fixed-rate period. That would put the two
rates within the ambit of the 25 basis point pre-
sumption. Hence, as long as the fixed period lasts a
year or less, it generally can be ignored for purposes
of the VRDI analysis. Of course, it is possible that
the fixed interest will differ from the variable rate. If
the difference between the fixed rate and the sub-
sequent rate is more than 25 basis points, the initial
fixed period cannot be ignored even if it lasts a year
or less, because the presumption will not be avail-
able, and the adviser will need to further research
the relationship between the fixed rate and the
floating rate.
3. Front- or backloading. If a RAN may still qualify
as a VRDI because it does not provide for a fixed-
rate period (or because the fixed period lasts a year
or less and is intended to approximate the objective
rate), the issuer must still consider whether there is
an expectation that the interest payments will be
front- or backloaded. Under reg. section 1.1275-
5(c)(4), a variable rate of interest is not an objective
rate if it is reasonably expected that the average
value of the rate during the first half of the instru-
ment’s term will be either significantly less than or
significantly greater than the average value of the
rate during the final half of the instrument’s term.
Then, the instrument will be treated as a CPDI.
Absent specific guidance in the regulations, an
adviser will need to think about how that rule may
apply to a particular structured note.
That is of particular relevance in the case of
RANs, because on any given day interest either
does or does not accrue. In our example, interest
accrues at either 7 or 0 percent based on whether the
range condition is satisfied. Obviously, the differ-
ence between 0 and 7 percent is significant. How-
ever, that difference may be averaged over the term
of the note, so that the difference in the yield of the
first half of the term is not significantly different
from the second half. Alternatively, an issuer may
simply expect that the range condition will be met
for every day of the note’s existence.
We would suggest that tax lawyers representing
issuers of those notes ask them for the probabilities
that the trigger that turns off the accrual is not hit
throughout the term of the note — namely, that
interest actually accrues through maturity (ignoring
for that purpose the call feature that is discussed
below). Obviously, doing so for each day may prove
extremely burdensome. We believe that looking at
those probabilities for the last day of each year of
the term is enough to get a good sense of the
projected interest payment flow. Given that those
probabilities are based on market projections, they
tend to be less accurate as we look further into the
future. So by definition, the probability that interest
37This assumes that the instrument does not qualify as a
VRDI under any other alternative.
38A form of note that raises similar issues is the ‘‘leveraged
steepener’’ note. A leveraged steepener generally provides a
fixed rate for an initial period of one or two years, followed by
a floating rate equal to one rate index (e.g., the 10-year CMS rate)
minus another rate (e.g., the two-year CMS rate), multiplied by
a leverage factor. These notes are generally treated as CPDIs
because either (i) the fixed-rate period is in excess of one year or
(ii) the fixed rate does not satisfy the approximation test. As in
the case of RANs, the floating rate on a leveraged steepener
would be an objective rate rather than a QFR because it would
not generally be reasonably expected to measure contempora-
neous variations in the cost of newly borrowed funds.
39Reg. section 1.1275-5(a)(3)(ii).
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on a RAN will not accrue would be expected to
increase throughout the term. Theoretically, then,
the longer the term of the note, the more susceptible
it is to CPDI classification (which may be a good
result for holders, as discussed below).
Again, given the lack of formal guidance on the
matter, we think that a more likely than not stand-
ard is reasonable. That is, if throughout the term of
the instrument it is more likely than not that interest
will accrue at 7 percent (rather than not accruing at
all), it should not be reasonably expected that
interest during the first half of the term of the
instrument will be significantly different from the
interest during the second half. If, however, for a
particular period it is more likely that interest will
not accrue at all, we again must look into the issue
of significance.
In the absence of guidance, one possible view is
that 25 basis points is a reasonable threshold. Under
that view, if the difference between the expected
yield during the first half of the term of the instru-
ment and the expected yield during the second half
of the term is larger than 25 basis points, it may be
reasonable to take the position that the instrument
is front- (or back-)loaded, and hence should be
classified as a CPDI. On the other hand, if the yield
through the term is expected to be high, a flat,
25-basis points yardstick seems less appropriate (for
example, if the expected yield is 7 percent during
the first half of the note and 6.74 percent during the
second half). We understand that different issuers
and tax practitioners use different tests to determine
whether a difference in yield is significant, and no
single market practice has evolved. Without any
formal guidance that remains a judgment call, and
the reasonableness of that judgment, as viewed by
the IRS, is anyone’s guess.
While the VRDI regulations contain a few ex-
amples that can be read to express the Treasury’s
view on front- and backloading (and hence purport
to provide some guidance when making the judg-
ment calls discussed above), the examples are con-
fusing at best. More specifically, reg. section 1.1275-
5(d), Example 5 (the S&P Example) addresses a debt
instrument issued on January 1, 1997, that pays
interest annually equal to a fixed percentage of the
value of the S&P 500.
While that rate is clearly based on objective
financial information, the S&P Example states that
‘‘based on historical data, it is reasonably expected
that the average value of the rate during the first
half of the instrument’s term will be significantly
less than the average value of the rate during the
final half of the instrument’s term.’’ The S&P
Figure 1
Source: S&P Indexes
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Example then concludes that the rate is not
objective because of backloading. Unfortunately
(and unhelpfully), the S&P Example does not
describe any of the other terms of the instrument,
many of which would almost certainly be relevant
(such as the term to maturity of the instrument).
Historical S&P performance data explain, in part,
the reasoning in the S&P Example. The first chart
(Figure 1) shows the S&P’s value from 1977 to
January 1, 1997 (the issue date of the hypothetical
instrument in Example 5).
The performance of the S&P in the intervening 14
years, however, tends to undermine the example.
The second chart (Figure 2) shows the S&P’s value
from 1997 to January 1, 2012.
It should be readily apparent that the historical
data on which this example relies no longer un-
equivocally support the view that a rate based on a
percentage of the current value of the S&P 500 is
backloaded. While it is not clear whether the ex-
ample refers to then-available historical data or
historical data for the specific note discussed in the
example, or whether the example makes a broader
judgment regarding the index, it is often read to
imply that the IRS believes that the S&P 500 (and
perhaps all equity indices) is expected to increase
over time.40
It is our understanding that notwithstanding the
example, in analyzing debt instruments, practi-
tioners take the view that the S&P 500 and other
equity indices are not expected, by definition, to
increase under all circumstances or over all time
periods. That appears to be the more correct appli-
cation of the front-loading/backloading require-
ment, and it would be helpful if the IRS stated in
guidance (formal or otherwise) that the example
40Admittedly, there are some strong arguments for this
position as well. Equity prices reflect both real and inflationary
gains, and thus a portion of the increase in equity indices merely
reflects a decrease in the intrinsic value of the measuring
currency (assuming the prevailing rate of inflation is positive).
Moreover, while recent events indicate otherwise, major equity
indices have generally increased over most sufficiently long-
term periods. On the other hand, the most common formulation
of the S&P 500 (and most indices as well) does not take
dividends into account and has a somewhat (although likely not
fully) offsetting downward bias to the extent earnings distribu-
tions are not reflected in the index level.
Figure 2
Source: S&P Indexes
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should be read narrowly and in light of the relevant
facts at the time of the issuance of the regulations.41
Inversely, the regulations include an example
(the CPI Example) in which a rate based on the
Consumer Price Index is treated as an objective rate.
The example addresses a debt instrument issued on
January 1, 1997, that provides for annual interest
payments equal to the CPI plus a 4 percent spread,
subject to a floor of 0.42 The CPI Example concludes
that that rate is not a QFR because it ‘‘cannot
reasonably be expected to measure contempora-
neous variations in the cost of newly borrowed
funds,’’43 but that it is an objective rate because it is
based on objective economic information using a
single fixed formula. Implicit in that conclusion is
that the CPI is never front- or backloaded. Just as
the S&P Example appears to draw the very broad
conclusion that the S&P is expected to rise over the
term of an instrument (regardless of its duration,
inflation levels, or the current state of the market),
the CPI Example appears to conclude that a CPI-
linked rate is never expected to be front- or back-
loaded. It would be helpful if the IRS provided
some guidance on the scope of the CPI Example as
well.
C. The Significance of the Call Feature
With most, if not all, RANs, the issuer has the
right to call the instruments before maturity. That
makes perfect sense because if interest rates remain
low late into the term of the instrument, issuers will
have little desire to absorb the cost associated with
hedging themselves against high payouts in a lin-
gering low-rate environment. The OID regulations
provide that in determining the maturity date,
options held by the issuer are deemed to be exer-
cised or not exercised in a way that minimizes the
YTM of the note.44 In the case of most RANs (such
as in our example), there is no way to determine, as
of the issue date, whether an early redemption will
minimize YTM. Theoretically, depending on the
reference of the range accrual, that reference may be
well outside the accrual range. That will result in a
zero borrowing cost for the issuer, making it ex-
tremely unlikely that the note will be called. On the
other hand, as mentioned above, the instrument is
sure to be called if payout exceeds market rates.
Therefore, the presumption in the OID regulations
is unhelpful.
The lack of guidance further complicates matters
if the note is classified as a CPDI. Under the CPDI
regulations, an instrument that is issued for cash
and classified as a CPDI is subject to accrual based
on the non-contingent bond method.45 Under those
rules, the amount of interest that holders are re-
quired to take into account for each accrual period
is determined by constructing a projected payment
schedule for the instrument and applying rules
similar to those for accruing OID on a hypothetical
non-contingent debt instrument with that projected
payment schedule. That method is applied by first
determining the yield at which the issuer would
issue a non-contingent fixed rate debt instrument
with terms and conditions similar to the actual
instrument (the comparable yield) and then deter-
mining as of the issue date a payment schedule that
would produce the comparable yield. That rather
simple treatment tends to be ambiguous in the
context of a call feature because of some obscurities
in the CPDI regulations.
As noted above, the general rule is that for OID
purposes, issuers are presumed to call the instru-
ment in a way that reduces the yield. The ambiguity
of that principle for instruments such as ours, when
it is not clear how a hypothetical exercise of the call
right would affect the yield, is magnified by the fact
that the application of that assumption is not con-
sistent throughout the CPDI regulations. Those
regulations prescribe that ‘‘the projected payment
schedule is determined by using the principles of
section 1.1272-1(c)(5).’’46 However, the CPDI regu-
lations remain silent regarding the application of
the call presumption in the context of the computa-
tion of the comparable yield. Thus, we could read
the CPDI regulations to say that a 15-year CPDI that
is assumed to be called at the end of the second year
has a projected payment schedule that makes all the
payments under that note by the end of the second
year, and that those payments amount to a yield of
a 15-year note. This literal reading would also mean
that holders accrue interest based on a 15-year
comparable yield, even though the projected pay-
ment schedule only lasts a year. That makes very
little (if any) sense. We believe that the projected
payment schedule as well as the comparable yield
should be based on the same term to maturity. Also,
41In practice, the S&P Example appears even less relevant, in
that many RANs linked to equity index performance also have
caps, floors, or rate-linked components (such as a dual structure
in which both an equity index and a rate underlier must be
within a given range for interest to accrue).
42Reg. section 1.1275-5(d), Example 10.
43That appears relatively uncontroversial as, while inflation
is a component of prevailing nominal interest rates and would
be expected to have some correlation with market rates, changes
in inflation do not reflect changes in real interest rates. The
regulations tend to construe that requirement narrowly in
analogous contexts. Compare reg. section 1.1275-5(d), Example 8
(French franc LIBOR rate does not measure contemporaneous
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when it is unclear how the call presumption ap-
plies, it is reasonable to assume that the instrument
simply remains outstanding until maturity.47
D. The Alternative Payment Schedule Rules
The alternative payment schedule rules raise yet
another potential problem for RANs. Under the
rules, if a specific payment schedule is significantly
more likely than not to occur, the yield and maturity
of the instrument are computed based on that
payment schedule.48 If such a payment schedule
exists, the instrument is treated as providing for
qualified stated interest (QSI) based on the lowest
fixed rate at which QSI would be payable under any
schedule.49 The excess is then added to the stated
redemption price at maturity of the instrument,
thereby giving rise to OID if the excess of SRPM
over issue price exceeds the de minimis threshold.
The potential application of those rules to RANs
is not clear. In some cases, an issuer may project that
it is likely that the accrual condition for a RAN will
be met during every single measuring day of the
instrument’s term. If that schedule is significantly
more likely than not to occur, it would initially
appear that the RAN provides for an alternative
payment schedule subject to those rules, because
the exact amount of interest to accrue is known (7
percent). If the rules apply, the RAN will be treated
as providing for the maximum possible interest in
each period. However, because there exists a sched-
ule under which no payments would be made (if
the accrual condition is not met on any date), the
instrument would be treated as having no QSI and
would likely constitute an OID instrument. Holders
and issuers would then appear to be required to
include and deduct amounts in accordance with the
OID rules. As with the option rules, a change in
circumstances (that is, a payment not in accordance
with the alternative payment schedule) would then
cause a deemed retirement and reissuance for pur-
poses of sections 1272 and 1273.50
While those rules specifically override the CPDI
rules,51 it is less clear whether they apply to RANs
that would otherwise be treated as VRDIs. The
VRDI rules do not contain a similar statement that
the alternative payment schedule rules override
VRDI treatment, and thus it appears to us that the
better answer is that the rules do not apply to such
RANs. However, as with many of the topics dis-
cussed in this report, the IRS may disagree.
E. Uncertain Accruals
In general, the interest payment on a range
accrual note is unknown until the date of determi-
nation (as it depends on the number of days in the
accrual period in which the range conditions are
met). That can raise questions for accrual basis
taxpayers, who are required to include interest in
income as it economically accrues, rather than wait-
ing for the payment date. For example, an accrual
basis holder of the note described in Section III.A
above may reach the end of its accrual period only
40 days into a 90-day determination period for the
RAN. Assuming that the S&P has met the range
condition for 30 of those 40 days, should the holder
accrue 30 days worth of interest, or some other
amount?
Assume, for example, that the S&P did not meet
the range accrual conditions for the remainder of
the accrual term. That means that if an accrual basis
taxpayer included the entire amount of the 30 days
accrual in income, there is an argument that the
taxpayer substantially advanced its income inclu-
sion for that period. However, one could argue that
the amount of accrual for the 30 days is already
fixed and is attributable in its entirety to the first 40
days of the accrual period, and therefore, the tax-
payer should include the entire amount in income.
F. Classification Can Matter
In our view, the main tax question raised by RANs
is their tax classification (VRDI or CPDI). Sometimes,
classification matters very little, if at all, because
payments that depart from a CPDI’s projected pay-
ment schedule will cause the comparable yield ac-
crual to be adjusted via positive or negative
adjustments; therefore, the holder and issuer end up
including and deducting, respectively, similar
amounts (aside from the considerable inconvenience
of dealing with CPDIs both on the holder’s and the
issuer’s side).52 That is not the case, however, if the
RAN provides for an initial fixed rate. If that note
were treated as a VRDI, with all interest being clas-
sified as QSI, holders would simply recognize the
interest payments as being received or accrued
based on their regular method of accounting. If the
instrument is classified as a CPDI, holders would
accrue income based on the comparable yield,
which, for those sorts of RANs, is probably lower
than the annual payment rate during the initial fixed
term. That is favorable for holders who hold the
instrument through maturity. Our note, for example,
provides for a fixed rate of 7 percent for two years.
According to the disclosure, let’s assume that the
comparable yield based on which holders will be
47See Garlock, supra note 12, at para. 904.05[C].
48Reg. section 1.1272-1(c)(2).
49Reg. section 1.1273-1(c)(2); see also reg. section 1.1273-1(f),
Example 4.
50Reg. section 1.1272-1(c)(6).
51Reg. section 1.1275-4(a)(2)(iii). 52See Garlock, supra note 12.
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required to accrue their interest income is close to 5
percent. Because the payments during the initial
term are fixed, there will be no net negative or posi-
tive adjustment. The bottom line is that for the first
two years of the instrument, holders will pay tax as
if they received a 5 percent annual return, when in
fact they received a 7 percent annual return. While
holders will have to recognize more income than
actual payments received during the rest of the term,
in terms of net present value, the tax deferral during




Step-up notes (Step-Ups) are notes that, most
commonly and simply, entitle the holder during the
first-rate period (generally between one and 10
years) to periodic interest payments at a fixed rate.
During one or more subsequent periods, the inter-
est rate steps up to a higher fixed rate. Before each
step-up, or periodically throughout the term of the
instrument, the issuer generally is entitled to call
the instrument at par plus any accrued and unpaid
interest.
As a basic example, assume a 15-year instrument
issued at par. For the first five years, the instrument
pays interest at 5 percent; for the next five years, it
pays 6 percent; and for the remaining five years
until maturity, it pays 7 percent. The issuer is
entitled to call the instrument at par plus accrued
but unpaid interest on quarterly call dates. Varia-
tions on that instrument (i) may include fixed-rate
periods of one year or less and (ii) may be issued for
less than par, either under an offering at a discount
or a variable price re-offer in which dealers offer
notes to initial purchasers at variable prices.53
Step-Ups are generally marketed to investors
who are dissatisfied with current market rates and
seek an investment with a return expected to in-
crease over time. Step-Ups are also marketed as
being less volatile than otherwise identical vanilla
debt by virtue of their increasing yield (which
would be expected to decrease the sensitivity of the
instrument to an increase in prevailing rates) and
call feature (which would decrease potential upside
on a rate decline because it would increase the
probability of an issuer call). It may be a stretch to
call Step-Ups structured, given their fairly simple
design in contrast to other notes discussed above.
That said, the market and trade publications tend to
group Step-Ups with other structured notes.
B. Tax Classification
Market participants generally take the position
that Step-Ups should be treated as fixed-rate debt
because of the operation of the Treasury regulations
governing unconditional options to put or call debt
instruments. More specifically, as noted above, reg.
section 1.1272-1(c)(5) states that ‘‘an issuer is
deemed to exercise or not exercise an option or
combination of options in a manner that minimizes
the yield on the debt instrument, and a holder is
deemed to exercise or not exercise an option or
combination of options in a manner that maximizes
the yield on the debt instrument.’’ Because exercis-
ing the call option immediately before the first
step-up generally minimizes the yield of the instru-
ment, such an exercise is presumed under the
regulations, whether an exercise is inevitable or
even likely.54
If that exercise does not occur, that failure would
constitute a change in circumstances under the
regulations, and for purposes of determining issue
price and OID, the instrument would be deemed to
be retired and reissued for its adjusted issue price
on the date of the change of circumstances.55 As-
suming the notes were issued at par or sufficiently
close to par such that any discount would constitute
de minimis OID, the notes would be treated as
vanilla fixed-rate debt, and any note deemed reis-
sued under the change in circumstances rule would
be treated that way as well (with the de minimis
threshold calculated based on the term of the re-
issued instrument). Other wrinkles can be intro-
duced when Step-Ups include periods lasting one
year or less, in that the reissued instrument could be
subject to the special rules applicable to short-term
debt instruments. We note that reg. section 1.1272-
2(f)(2) provides that notwithstanding reg. section
1.1271-2(c), for the purpose of determining whether
a debt instrument is short or long term, its maturity
date is the last possible date on which it could be
outstanding. Accordingly, except potentially for the
last possible step-up period that lasts a year or less,
no deemed reissued Step-Up should be treated as a53It should be noted that some issuers have issued floating-
rate debt instruments that call for multiple-rate step-ups. Mar-
ket participants generally treat those notes as CPDIs or VRDIs,
and the discussion below does not apply to them.
Also, other types of step-up notes are linked to indices or
currencies and feature additional characteristics, such as down-
side exposure or a minimum guaranteed return. They would
generally be treated as non-debt forward contracts (also referred
to as executory or financial contracts) or, if there were sufficient
downside protection, as CPDIs.
54It should be noted that when Step-Ups are issued at a
discount, it is possible that exercise of the issuer call would not
minimize yield, and so each issuance must be analyzed inde-
pendently as to whether the presumption applies.
55Reg. section 1.1272-1(c)(6); see also reg. section 1.1272-1(j),
Example 5(iii).
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short-term debt instrument for OID purposes.56 We
understand, however, that there are notes in the
market for which the final step-up period is one
year or less. Thus, advisers should be mindful of
that possibility.
Further, Step-Ups are occasionally issued at a dis-
count, either by virtue of an initial sale at less than
par or a variable price re-offer in which notes are sold
to ultimate investors at variable prices below par.
Because the discount amortizes over the term of the
instrument and each call before a step-up is at par,
it is possible that the presence of a discount can
change whether the instrument will be presumed to
be called under the presumption rules discussed
above. Issuers and holders should be mindful that
even if the discount is de minimis for some periods,
shorter periods after a step-up (in which the note
would be deemed reissued if it is not called) would
have a lower de minimis OID threshold and could
cause the deemed reissued note to constitute an OID
instrument, necessitating increased and more com-
plex reporting by issuers and holders.57
C. Policy Issues
Compared with FTF notes and RANs, the treat-
ment of Step-Ups is relatively simple and seemingly
uncontroversial. One potential concern, however, is
the apparent breakdown of the rationale of the OID
presumption rules. Under the rules, one presumes
the call to be exercised before each step-up. How-
ever, if rates are expected to increase dramatically,
that is not an economically rational assumption,
because the stepped-up rate may be highly likely to
be a below-market rate at the time of the call. In that
case, the issuer would be very unlikely to exercise
its call.
By contrast, if the rules were instead not to
presume the call to be exercised, on the basis that an
exercise would be economically irrational given
projected rates, the instrument should be treated as
having OID equal to the sum of any payments of
interest in excess of the lowest rate paid under the
instrument.58 If the OID exceeded the de minimis
threshold, the holder would have an OID instru-
ment. As a result, the holder would include and the
issuer would deduct an amount in excess of stated
interest payments in earlier periods and an amount
less than the stated interest payments in later pe-
riods, including the OID on a constant-yield basis.59
That treatment arguably would conform more
closely to the economics of the instrument. That
said, it would also significantly complicate the tax
treatment to holders and issuers and would intro-
duce significant complexity into the presumption
rules. The current approach may therefore be justi-
fied as a form of rough justice and simplicity rather
than a completely accurate accrual of economic
income and deductions.
V. Conclusion
Issuers of structured products have displayed
their creativity time and time again through the
introduction of products that appeal to current
market sentiment and occasionally obtain preferen-
tial tax treatment over economically equivalent
alternatives. Like other economic climates, the era
of near-zero nominal and real rates will pass and
these innovations will fade from the market, at least
for a time. Until then, however, it will remain
critical for issuers, holders, and advisers to be
mindful of the questions raised by novel rate-linked
structures of the types discussed in this article.
56Reg. section 1.1271-2(c)(6) provides that a debt instrument
should be treated as retired and reissued ‘‘solely’’ for the
purposes of sections 1272 and 1273 if a contingency that is
deemed to occur is not to occur.
57For a holder who has elected to include de minimis OID on
the note currently, this concern would not arise as a note’s
adjusted issue price is increased by a holder’s prior OID
inclusions. Reg. section 1.1275-1(b)(1). It does not appear, how-
ever, that a secondary holder could rely on a prior holder’s
accrual of de minimis OID. As a practical matter, it is impossible
for a secondary purchaser, at least of a publicly traded note, to
determine the prior holder’s method for accounting for de
minimis OID. Moreover, application of the adjusted issue price
rules in that manner for notes sold on a secondary market
would render the notes non-fungible, introducing many prob-
lems for holders and issuers. The regulations provide that
subsequent holders may determine adjusted issue price ‘‘in any
manner consistent with’’ the OID regulations. Reg. section
1.1275-1(b)(3). It would appear consistent with the OID regula-
tions to disregard the prior holder’s tax elections for purposes of
determining adjusted issue price, if that information is not
obtainable.
In practice, we are unaware of any holder who has elected to
include de minimis OID on a note currently.
58Reg. section 1.1273-1(a), (b), (c); see also reg. section 1.1273-
1(f), Example 3.
59Reg. section 1.1272-1(b).
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